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We argue that the process of European economic integration has made a
qualitative shift: from a Listian symmetrical economic integration to an
integrative and asymmetrical integration. This shift started in the early
1990s with the integration of the former Soviet economies into the
economies of Europe and the world as a whole, reached its climax with
the Eastern enlargement of the Union in 2004, and now forms the foun-
dation of the renewed Lisbon Strategy. This change is measurably threat-
ening European welfare: the economic periphery in the first instance, and
potentially the core countries as well. Two parallel processes aggravate
this development: the timing of the enlargement at this particular phase of
the evolving techno-economic paradigm; and the creation of the European
Monetary Union along the so-called Maastricht route towards convergence
and fiscal stability.
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1. Introduction
Economic integration can take many forms. Some are more conducive to
wealth and freedom than others. Colonialism was probably the first form of
international economic integration. Intuitively, we understand that what the
European Union has attempted to achieve is something qualitatively very
different from colonialism. Successful economic integrations are win-win-
situations that extend and develop capitalism to new areas. On the other
hand, unsuccessful ones are forms of integration where one or both parties
lose, or are prevented from, dynamic economic structures conducive to
wealth creation.
In this paper we argue that European economic integration has made a qual-
itative shift from one type of economic integration to another: from a Listian
symmetrical economic integration to an integrative and asymmetrical inte-
gration. This shift started in the early 1990s with the integration of the for-
mer Soviet economies into the European and world economies, reached its
climax with the Eastern enlargement of the Union in 2004, and currently
forms the foundation of the renewed Lisbon Strategy. This change is meas-
urably threatening European welfare: the economic periphery in the first
instance, and potentially the core countries as well. Two parallel processes
aggravate this development: first, the timing of the enlargement in the pres-
ent phase of the techno-economic paradigm under conditions of normal cir-
cumstances characterised by deflationary and downward pressures on
2wages, like in the 1930s (Perez 2002, 2004, 2006); second, the creation
of European Monetary Union along the so-called Maastricht route towards
convergence and fiscal stability that brought not only price convergence
and low inflation but also high levels of unemployment and stagnating
domestic demand in leading European economies (Kregel 1999; Bibow
2001).
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The internal dynamics of Europe is a microcosm of the same type of prob-
lems confronting the entire global economy: the key problem of uneven
development in the productive structure, especially of the de-industrialised
or non-industrialised peripheries, is marginally, if at all, addressed. The poor-
ly developed industrial structure in respective peripheries fails to create the
necessary demand that would create a high value-added service sector.
Economic problems in the peripheries are solved by the migration of labour,
rather than by addressing their structural requirements for development.
Contrary to mainstream discourse in economic integration that predicts a
convergence towards ‘factor-price equalization’, asymmetrical integration
may lead to ‘factor-price polarization’ – that is, increasing gaps in real
wages. Take the case of Moldova, a country in Europe’s periphery which
shows very similar symptoms to Guyana, also a peripheral economy, but
under the US influence. While more than 70% of Guyanese with universi-
ty education work outside the country, a generation of children in Moldova
is growing up separated from their parents who both have to work abroad.
Some areas in the European periphery are threatened by the same sequen-
tial development as in a number of areas in Southern Mexico: de-industrial-
isation, de-agriculturalisation, de-population.
In the following section, we provide a brief taxonomy of economic integra-
tions. We then delineate EU’s Eastern enlargement through succeeding
industrial and structural changes in Central and Eastern Europe from the
1990s to the mid 2000s. And, finally, we look at some policy responses in
the EU, chiefly the Lisbon process.
2. Taxonomy of economic integrations
A key feature of pre-Smithian economics was a taxonomic understanding
of the economic world of production. This taxonomy of economic activities,
in turn, led to a taxonomy of types of international trade that could, respec-
tively, benefit only one of the trading partners or both. The seeds of this
taxonomy can be found already in the 1550s (Ortiz 1558); it solidified
towards the end of the 1600s and was accepted across Europe as com-
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4 Due to space limitations, the impact of techno-economic paradigms and EMU on EU’s enlargement
can only be mentioned in this article and not discussed with depth these issues would deserve.mon sense in the early 1700s. The pre-Smithian taxonomy of ‘good’ and
‘bad’ trade was based on the observation of the obvious urban bias of eco-
nomic development that was found everywhere in Europe. The taxonomy
is based on the fundamental understanding that economic development is
activity-specific, at any point in time available in some economic activities
rather than in others. Development was seen as a goal created by increas-
ing returns and innovations in manufacturing and not in agriculture, where
stagnant productivity, diminishing returns and monoculture, and absence of
synergies prevented growth. Furthermore, the targeting, support, and pro-
tection of manufacturing were argued in terms of [a] its ability to create
wealth; [b] its ability to create employment; [c] its ability to solve balance
of payment problems; [d] its ability to increase the velocity of circulation of
money (see Botero 1590; Serra 1613; King 1721). Starting in the 1700s,
great emphasis was put on the beneficial synergies between manufacturing
and agriculture: only where there was manufacturing, was there success-
ful agriculture (Reinert 2007).
This accumulated wisdom was taken over in the economics of Friedrich List
(1841), who was the theoretical economist behind the industrialization of
continental Europe. List is conventionally regarded as a protectionist, but he
was the first visionary of European economic integration once all nations
had achieved a comparative advantage in manufacturing (increasing returns
industries) (see Reinert 1998). List quotes Serra (1613), and sees manu-
facturing synergies as being the very basis for civilization, rather than trade:
Let us compare Poland with England: both nations at one time were in the
same stage of culture; and now what a difference. Manufactories and manu-
factures are the mothers and children of municipal liberty, of intelligence, of
the arts and scences, of internal and external commerce, of navigation and 
improvements in transport, of civilization and of political power. They are
the chief way of liberating agriculture from itschains ... The popular school
(i.e., Adam Smith and J. B. Say, authors’ note) has attributed this civilizing
effect to foreign trade, but in that it has confounded the mere exchanger
with the originator. (List 1841: 142)
We argue that – regardless of what economic theory might have said – the
practice and history of European economic integration has, until very
recently, been based on the understanding expressed here by List: eco-
nomic integration has essentially taken place between nations that already
have achieved a comparative advantage in increasing returns activities
(manufacturing) or, alternatively, as colonialism.
A theory of economic integration developed out of this understanding of
economic development. This was the practice followed in Europe for cen-
turies, including during the gradual build-up of what came to be the
European Union over the decades following World War II. An essential fea-
4ture of this type of economic theory is the understanding of the synergies
between increasing return activities (urban/manufacturing activities) and
the production of raw materials (rural activities). 
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The clearest early statement of this theory is found on the first pages of
Charles King’s three volume work (King 1721, vol. 1: 1-5), a compilation
of works published in the previous decade, which was to enjoy unique
authority for decades. It is important to note that his theory is based on a
possible discrepancy between the interest of the merchant and the interest
of the nation itself: ‘There are general Maxims in Trade which are assented
to by every body. That a Trade may be of Benefit to the Merchant and
Injurious to the Body of the Nation, is one of these Maxims’ (King 1721:
1). This is, of course, very different from the later teachings of Adam Smith,
who assumes an automatic harmony of interest between merchant and
nation. In King’s scheme, the normal pre-Smithian scheme, the vested inter-
ests of some economic actors will coincide with those of the nation-state
– mainly those of the manufacturers – while the vested interests of other
economic actors will be at odds with the interests of the nation-state. Yet,
it is precisely this crucial link between the interest of the state (higher
wealth) and that of industry that is essential to the success of modern
nation-states in Europe and North-America (a point made already by
Schmoller in 1884; see also Backhaus 2001).
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As a continuation of King’s principles, and with the experience of 300 more
years of economic history, we can establish the taxonomy – based on ‘ideal
types’ – of economic integrations.
7 There are two main types: symmetrical
free trade areas (i.e., integration among nations at a similar level of eco-
nomic development and economic sophistication), and asymmetrical free
trade areas (i.e. integration of nations with widely different economic struc-
ture at different levels of development). Our taxonomy may be seen as an
evolutionary alternative to Balassa’s taxonomy of regional trading arrange-
ments as a sequence from free trade area through customs union and com-
mon market to economic union.
5
5 If increasing returns are attributed to manufacturing industries and diminishing returns are attrib-
uted to the production of raw materials, King’s taxonomy is perfectly compatible with more recent
trade theories (e.g. Graham 1923) and Krugman’s ‘new trade theory’ (Krugman 1990).
6 It can be argued that early development economics started with very similar ideas, see, e.g.,
Rosenstein-Rodan 1943, Singer 1950, and Nurkse 1953.
7 We will not deal with monetary unions and integration; Priewe (2006) gives a very fruitful discus-
sion of the European enlargement processes from a monetary union and optimum currency areas
perspective; see also Kregel 1999 and Bibow 2001 on the role of Maastricht conditions in the con-
vergence policies for the European monetary union.2.1 Symmetrical free trade areas
2.1.1 Listian Integration (From Friedrich List)
Examples of Listian economic integration are 19th century Germany and the
‘old’ European Union. Listian economic integration is between nations on
roughly similar levels of GDP per capita, that all have a comparative advan-
tage in increasing return activities. This insures that economic integration
will not de-industrialise, de-skill or create large-scale unemployment in any
of the partner countries. Large Listian areas can, however, absorb small
units of relatively more backward countries to the benefit of all parties. An
example of this is the integration of Portugal in the old EU, where mature
and labour intensive industries could be farmed out to Portugal, increasing
real wages both in Portugal and in the rest of the EU (see also Priewe 2006:
160-162 on waves of European enlargement). In this case integration can
be seen as a variant of the flying geese type (see below).
Two main variables determine the ability of a Listian integration to absorb
poorer partner countries to mutual benefit. Firstly: the Schumpeterian
dynamism of the core (wealthy) countries; i.e., the more dynamic the core
countries, the more mature industries they can farm out to the poorer part-
ners without hurting their own employment and wage level. The second
variable is the size of the poorer country/countries to be integrated; i.e., the
smaller the pool of people to be integrated, the easier the integration
becomes.
A symmetrical Listian free trade area can be converted to an integrated wel-
fare state at a relatively low cost. Listian integration is a typical win-win
strategy if it does not deteriorate into a welfare colonialism (see 2.3 below).
2.1.2 Peripheral Symmetrical Integration
Examples of ‘peripheral symmetrical integration’ are Pacto Andino and
Mercosur. These are cases of economic integration of peripheral nations
whose international comparative advantage does not lie in increasing return
industries, but that wish to grow such activities and need a bigger market.
Included in successful schemes of this type are preferences for relative lag-
ging countries, as was planned for Ecuador and Bolivia in the Pacto Andino.
The Latin American Free Trade Association (LAFTA/ALALC) is an example
of such an integration that failed. A problem with this type of integration is
often that such nations have similar economic structures and relatively lit-
tle to sell to each other. This type of regional integration is probably a nec-
essary stepping stone before reaching global free trade (see also Jacobs
61984). Peripheral symmetrical integration is also a win-win strategy if the
right dynamics are achieved.
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2.2 Asymmetrical free trade areas
2.2.1 ‘Colonial’ and Non-Integrative
In the classical colonial relationship, a dynamic industrial nation integrates
with a periphery that, whether explicitly stated or not, is not to specialise
in innovation and increasing returns activities. Traditionally, ‘colonies’ spe-
cialised in supplying raw materials. With the current techno-economic par-
adigm that enables increasing specialization as well as outsourcing, a more
sophisticated neo-colonial division of labour appears as both manufacturing
and agriculture sectors split up in a high-tech/capital intensive/inno-
vative/high wage segments, on the one hand, and a low-tech/low capital
intensity/non-innovative/low wage segments, on the other hand. Mexico is
the country where this development is most visible. The old manufacturing
sector, containing ‘complete’ industries is shrinking and being replaced by
the  maquila sector consisting of unmechanisable fragments of a global
value chain seeking low wage and low skilled labour. This development
finds its parallel in the Mexican agricultural sector, where highly subsidised
US imports of mechanisable grain – produced with exceptionally advanced
technology including unmanned tractors using global positioning equipment
– is replacing Mexican agriculture even in a traditional product like corn
while Mexico specialises in exporting unmechanisable agricultural produce,
e.g., strawberries and cucumbers. In effect, such developments bring in
developed countries lower prices and higher gains to consumers and pro-
ducers respectively. In financial terms we can indeed observe that capital
tends flow from developing countries to developed countries, and not vice
versa as much of economic mainstream assumes both in theory and in pol-
icy advice (see for an excellent overview of the issue, Kregel 2004). The
Mexican national innovation system is deteriorating accordingly, and return-
ing to a centre-periphery relationship with the United States (Cimoli 2000). 
In asymmetrical trading areas the Vanek-Reinert Effect
9 starts operating,
and the least advanced nation concentrates in the low-skilled areas both in
manufacturing and also in agriculture. In the worst case this can lead to
rampant de-industrialisation and plummeting real wages (Reinert 2003 and
7
8 It can be argued that former Soviet economies (COMECON) fell into this symmetrical category
because of the emphasis on distribution of increasing return activities. Of course, all trade was con-
trolled and thus also, arguably, integration and its results.
9 In rapid liberalisation of trade and markets between countries/regions with strongly unequal levels
of development, the first to suffer from competition are most developed industries of the less devel-
oped country/region, see Reinert 1980 and 2007 in detail.2004). In Mexico a deteriorating sequence can be observed: first de-indus-
trialization, subsequently de-agriculturalisation (even of the country’s most
traditional crop, maize) and finally de-population. In many areas of Southern
Mexico only the population above 60 years old and below 12 years old is
left. The others are working in the United States or further north in Mexico.
The success of this strategy from the colonising nation’s point of view
depends on the same variables as mentioned above. If the Schumpeterian
dynamics in the rich country is high enough, and the supply of labour to be
absorbed is not too big, or protection can be kept at a point securing
employment, the rich country may have all the advantages of producing
technologically mature and labour-intensive crops with cheap foreign
labour, but not the disadvantages.
Classical colonialism is a win-lose strategy: the colonial power wins while the
colony loses. However, this is potentially a lose-lose strategy if the colonial
power loses control or loses dynamism. Potentially, Mexican real wages may
fall while, at the same time, wages fall in the US, when the ‘giant sucking
sound’ hits US employment and real wages as US 1992 presidential candi-
date Ross Perot used to talk about. If the world moves towards factor-prize
equalisation, this may very well be downwards. (In this sense, David Ricardo
may be right that the ‘natural’ price of labour is close to human subsistence.) 
2.2.2 Flying Geese, or Sequential Technological Upgrading
The flying geese metaphor for economic integrations first appears in a 1935
article by Kaname Akamatsu published in Japanese. His views became
known to the West in his 1961 article in Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv, and
during the 1980s Japanese economist and foreign minister Saburo Okita
propagated the concept.
10 The essence of the flying geese pattern of eco-
nomic integration is that nations upgrade and catch up technologically by
sequentially riding the same technological wave. It essentially describes the
way East Asian nations grew. The model builds on Friedrich List’s stages
of integration. Its dynamics are similar to Michael Porter’s stages of nation-
al development (Porter 1990) and to Ray Vernon’s life-cycle theory of inter-
national trade (Vernon 1966) and to Jane Jacobs’ import-replacing devel-
opment of cities (Jacobs 1984). 
To illustrate the process, follow a product: a hairdryer is produced in Japan
and exported to the rest of the world. When Japan upgrades its technolo-
8
10 As he readily admits, Akamatsu’s theory rests on a Germanic conception of society and econo-
my, references to Kant, List, Sombart and Schumpeter – as well as to Russian economist Nikolai
Kondratiev – abound.gy and wage level, the production of hairdryers passes on to Korea and is
exported from that country. As Korean production after a while also gets
more sophisticated, the production of simple hairdryers passes on to
Taiwan, where the phenomenon is again repeated. Hairdryer production
moves on to Malaysia and Thailand, and finally to Vietnam. On the way all
nations have increased their wealth and upgraded technologically, based on
the same product.
The flying geese strategy has proved spectacularly successful in East Asia
– a true win-win form of economic integration – where Korea moved up
from being poorer than Tanzania in 1950. However, the strategy was only
possible because it was in the interest of the United States to build a cor-
don sanitaire of well-to-do countries around the communist world. This
strategy requires heavy-handed government intervention and is impossible
to initiate today under the rule of the Washington Institutions. Latin
American import-substitution initially contained strong elements of flying
geese, creating a win-win situation where US companies prolonged the life
cycle of their products by producing in Latin America. However, Latin
America failed to move to the next Listian stage – into regional integration
– through the failure of LAFTA/ALALC, and lost its dynamics. It should be
noted however that even the inefficient manufacturing sectors built up in
countries like Peru and Mongolia provided much higher real wages than
does global capitalism today.
2.3. Welfare Colonialism
The term ‘welfare colonialism’ was coined by anthropologist Robert Paine
(1977: 1-52) to describe the economic integration of the Arctic population
into Canada, and may partly well be applied to the integration of the Saami
people in Norway. The essential features of welfare colonialism are: [1] the
classical colonial drain is reversed, the net flow of funds is to the colony
rather than to the mother country; and [2] the native population is inte-
grated in a way that destroys their previous livelihood, and they are put on
the dole. Welfare colonialism identifies welfare as the potential vehicle for
a stable internal ‘governing at a distance’ through the exercise of a partic-
ularly subtle, ‘nondemonstrative’ (Paine 1977: 3) and dependency-generat-
ing form of neo-colonial social control that pre-empts local autonomy
through ‘well-intentioned’ and ‘generous’ – but ultimately ‘morally wrong’
– policies. Welfare colonialism creates paralysing dependencies on the ‘cen-
tre’ in a peripheral population, a centre exerting control through incentives
that create total economic dependency thus preventing political mobilisation
and autonomy.
9Clearly welfare colonialism is a very expensive form of economic integra-
tion, essentially paying people not to work. Not unlike the religious mis-
sionary element in traditional colonialism, welfare colonialism is in a sense
well-intended, but ends up being culturally destructive. Welfare colonialism
is a lose-lose form of economic integration: the periphery loses its traditional
livelihood and culture and becomes an economic burden to the colonial
power.
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2.4 Integrative and Asymmetrical Integration
‘Integrative and Asymmetrical Integration’ is a type of economic integration
that differs from the classical colonial version above in that it attempts to
integrate the asymmetrical partners – countries at different levels of eco-
nomic development – into a welfare state. We see the present European
Union enlargement as largely falling under this heading in terms of economic
integration. However, the future quality of integration in the new Europe is
by no means clear, it may well turn out to be a win-win integration or exact-
ly the opposite, a lose-lose one. Europe does not start as tabula rasa. In par-
ticular, the new member states have experienced in 1990s unprecedented
changes in economic and social terms. This decade of strong de-industrial-
isation and fall in GDP per capita in all new member states, with a possible
exception of Hungary, is an important factor that needs to be taken into
account. In what follows, we try to measure the development potential of
the new Europe and sketch out the dynamics determining this development.
3. The New Europe: Cost and Nature of the Integration
The economic integration of countries in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE)
and newly independent countries from the former Soviet Union (NIS) into
world markets after the fall of Berlin Wall in 1989 was based on three basic
assumptions shared by most of these countries: [1] economic liberalisation
through the abolition of controls over prices and production; [2] macro-eco-
nomic stabilisation through control of the money supply and balancing of
the government budget; and [3] the sale of state property to private indi-
viduals (Kregel et al.1992:14; also King 2002).
The goal of this architecture of change was rapid transition to free market
economy and, obviously, higher standard of living. However, in the after-
math of the fall of Berlin Wall and rapid liberalisation of trade and markets,
Central and Eastern European industry collapsed. In a matter of few years,
most CEE countries saw their GDP per capita drop in real terms one third
10
11 See Reinert (2006b) for a European case study of welfare colonialism in Norway.and more, and the NIS countries like Moldova, Ukraine and Russia have not
reached the level of 1990 GDP per capita even by 2005 (see Figure 1). 
Figure 1: GDP per capita in CEE and NIS countries 1990-2005 (constant 2000 USD),
1990 = 100.
For most CEE and NIS countries 1990s were in terms of GDP per capita
lost decades, Hungary forming here a notable exception; the rest of CEE
saw only with the arrival of the new century similar levels of GDP per capi-
ta as in 1990. 
Similar picture emerges when we look at the development of value added
in industry in CEE, NIS and other European countries (see Figure 2). Here
the impact of transition can be seen even more clearly: most CEE and NIS
countries saw steady growth in industry value added up to 1990, after
which there was a dramatic drop and countries like Estonia, Romania and


























Source: World Bank WDI online database.Figure 2: Industry value added in selected CEE, NIS, European and Asian economies
1980-2005 (constant 2000 USD), 1990=100.
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Source: World Bank WDI online database.
It is also significant to note how different has been South Korea’s and
Singapore’s development path in terms of industry value added since 1980.
Also, in accordance with our arguments above about the EU enlargement
in 1980s, Greece and Portugal saw steady growth in industry value added
in 1990s. 
In addition, World Bank data allows us to take a closer look at dynamics of































































































































12 Data is not available for all CEE and NIS countries. Using per-1990 data for CEE and NIS
economies can easily be criticised: these were not market economies, and military and strategic
notions were key for development and policy interventions. However, the latter can also be said
about East Asian economies and, in particular, also about US West Coast development after World
War II.Source: World Bank WDI online database; calculations by the authors.
Perhaps the most striking feature of developments depicted on Figure 3 is
the fact that in 1985 Latvia, Portugal and South Korea had all very similar
figures for industry value added per capita.
14 Again, 1990 marks the begin-
ning of highly different development paths where Latvia, along with
Romania and Hungary (the latter to a lesser extent) follow Latin America in
falling behind not only South Korean, Nordic and ‘old’ European economies,
but also Spain, Greece and Portugal. In addition, we can detect a slowdown
of development in France and Germany, or, to put it differently, the Nordic
countries are increasingly outperforming larger European economies.
It can be argue that the CEE industrial decline is, at least partially, part of a nat-
ural deindustrialization process where industry is gradually replaced by servic-
es, a process witnessed by most if not all countries in the last decades of 20th
century. However, by and large, we see similar picture to industrial develop-
ment in CEE also in services
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13 Data is not available for all CEE and NIS countries.
14 In the extreme world periphery, Mongolia, most industrial sectors were virtually exterminated, and
the only two growing industrial sectors are the collection of bird feathers to produce combed down
and the production of alcohol (Reinert 2004).
15 We use here statistical definition given by World Bank WDI online database: services correspond
to ISIC divisions 50-99. They include wholesale and retail trade (including hotels and restaurants),
transport, and government, financial, professional, and personal services such as education, health
care, and real estate services.
Figure 3: International comparison of industry value added per capita (constant
2000 USD) 1971-2005.
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to as ‘primitivisation’. (Reinert 2007) As Hans Singer (1950) argues, innova-
tion does not necessarily lead to higher standard of living: in raw materials it
frequently leads to falling export prices rather than increasing national income. 
Figure 4: Services value added in selected CEE, NIS, European and Asian economies
1980-2005 (constant 2000 USD), 1990=100.
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16 Data is not available for all CEE and NIS countries.
17 Data is not available for all CEE and NIS countries.
Source: World Bank WDI online database.
Source: World Bank WDI online database; calculations by the authors.We see that South Korea and Singapore, and the Nordic economies, are
performing exceedingly well also in services value added. The rise of ICT
enabled business services is certainly one of the key factors behind these
dramatic growth rates. However, we can also see that in services France
and Germany are keeping up with East Asian and Nordic economies. Similar
to industrial development, Spain, Portugal and Greece saw steady growth
also in services. CEE countries, in turn, have witnessed, similarly to indus-
try value added, a strong drop in services value added after 1990, the main
difference seems to be that the recovery was in services quicker by few
years: many CEE countries reach 1990 levels by late 1990s. However, the
difference of a year or two does not ameliorate the fact that also in servic-
es the 1990s were for CEE and NIS economies a lost decade. Yet, even if
the 2000s have brought both in industry and services significantly better
levels of value added for CEE countries (but certainly not for NIS
economies), it is difficult to talk about strong catching up in 2000s. On the
contrary, in terms of value added per capita, CEE economies lag behind
South Korea, Singapore and Finland more that they did in 1990 (see Figures
6 and 7). However, it can be argued that leading CEE economies like
Hungary are slowly catching up to Greece, Spain and Portugal.
Figure 6: Industry value added per capita (constant 2000 USD) in selected CEE, Asian





















Source: World Bank WDI online database;
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authors’ calculations
18 Similar data can be found also in Eurostat databases.Figure 7: Services value added per capita (constant 2000 USD) in selected CEE, Asian
and European economies, 1990-2005.
Source: World Bank WDI online database;
19
authors’ calculations
Inevitably, dynamic changes in value added are also reflected in changing
employment structure of an economy, and also in different sectors’ chang-
ing share of value added in GDP. CEE countries have witnessed dramatic
gains in service employment (e.g. from 36% to 53% of total employment
in Poland, from 37% to 57% in Bulgaria, from 1990 to 2005; World Bank
WDI online database). Similarly, the share of services value added as a per-
centage of GDP has risen in CEE countries very quickly in the period 1990-
2005 (e.g. from 33% to 58% in Bulgaria, from 33% to 66% in Estonia;
World Bank WDI online database). These changes are accompanied by
respective losses in industry employment and value added. While in indus-
try employment CEE countries lost 5-10% in 1990-2005 (which is compa-
rable to European and East Asian economies), then in share of industry
value added in GDP, CEE countries have seen drastic drops: from 49% to
29% in Estonia and from 50% to 30% in Poland, compared to change from
32% to 29% in Finland and from 41% to 40% in South Korea. (World Bank
WDI online database) 
We would argue that there are different kinds of deindustrialisation: in CEE
and NIS we see a type of deindustrialisation of poor countries, a result of a
too abrupt opening to free trade; in developed countries we see natural tran-
sition from industry to services of a mature and wealthy economy (Petty’s






















19 Similar data can be found also in Eurostat databases.high technology, increasing returns and high barriers to entry – that used
be the hallmark of manufacturing in former techno-economic paradigms.
These problems in the sphere of production, particularly in industry, rapidly
translate into balance of payment problems, and just as there was no
Marshall Plan to restore the productive sector of Eastern Europe as there
had been in the West after 1947, there were no counterparts in the mone-
tary sphere, nothing similar to the European Payments Union for settling
trade balances as in 1950-1958. Given the policy framework, the emerg-
ing developments in CEE and NIS countries inevitably increased social
stress and outer constraints in form of a negative current account balance.
Indeed, the former was the case in all countries and as Figure 8 illustrates,
in most CEE countries the current account balance deteriorates starting in
1993 and is accompanied by double digit growth rates of external debt
(World Bank WDI online database).
Figure 8: Current account (bars) and FDI (lines) as % of GDP in selected new member
states, 1992-2004.
Source: World Bank WDI Online Database.
By 2001, all CEE countries had a negative balance in trade of goods
(Sneijers 2004: 2). Yet, inflow of foreign direct investments (FDI), gradual-
ly picking up after the mid 1990s, enabled rapid change and covered some
of the negative trade balance consequences (see Figure 8). FDI also fuelled
rapid privatisation of industries: there was a strong correlation between FDI



















Czech RepublicYet, as we have seen above in industrial change dynamics in CEE, the finan-
cial architecture created for the transition turned both FDI and privatisation,
especially in the beginning, into means of ‘destructive destruction’ and
Myrdalian vicious circles. The most recent financial transfers by the state
to industrial companies of the Soviet period were transferred into loans of
newly founded banks to the same companies. Most of the latter were to be
privatised. This automatically created liabilities on the balance sheets of
companies, in turn making the industrial restructuring of companies very
difficult and creating high risks in the banking sector. The system set up
was weak and prone to crisis from the very beginning. Only companies with
previous experience in dealing with Western partners, managed to more or
less restructure and survive (a good case study is Radosevic/Yoruk 2001).
Thus, there was strong ‘liability destruction’ but hardly any ‘asset creation’
(see further Kregel et al. 1992: 44-54). This prepared the ground for the
Vanek-Reinert Effect, as we have seen above, to rapidly take root in CEE
and NIS industries. This, in turn, translated into a sudden and unprece-
dented onset of social problems: between 1989 and 1996 ‘the number of
poor and unemployed in the region [CEE and NIS] rose respectively by 100
and 10 million while the crime rate tripled’ (Cornia 2004). Almost all CEE
countries have experienced severe deterioration in life expectancy up to mid
1990s, and the NIS countries are still seeing lowering life expectancy
(Cornia 2004). In addition, all CEE countries experienced growth in region-
al and income inequality during the 1990s. Since the growing knowledge-
intensive service-sector needs demand from the manufacturing sector, this
sector also failed to develop sufficiently (with some exceptions, like con-
sumer banking). 
The positive effects of FDI and privatisation were thus offset by the dra-
matic rise in social problems as so-called transition costs. Arguably there
had to be some rather painful costs as well as uneven development (see,
e.g., Hirschmann 1958). Yet, by any standard or understanding of capital-
ism, the rapid liberalisation and onslaught of social problems should have
been counterbalanced by creation of new value by upgrading – rather than
permanently destroying – large parts of the previous industrial structure.
Yet, as we have seen above, this has not been the case. Furthermore, if we
look in more detail at the development of share of medium and high tech-
nology in manufactured exports (international competitiveness) and in man-
ufactured value added (quality of the industrial structure), the new EU mem-




20 For specific case studies, see Tiits et al. 2002; King 2002.Figure 9: Quality of industrial change in CEE, Latin America and East Asia.
Source: UNIDO 2004; authors’ calculations.
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In 1990, CEE countries had qualitatively better industrial structures and
were more similar to the East Asian economies than they are today.
However, by 2001 the difference between these two groups of countries
is truly astonishing. The quality of industrial change in the CEE countries in
1990s indicates that the incentives created by the transition architecture
for the private sector have not changed significantly over time, nor have
these incentives significantly increased productivity of labour and conse-
quently more income has not been generated. In other words, the high
human costs of transition have hardly been justified, and the policies initi-
ated and the socio-economic frameworks created in the 1990s have failed
to deliver. These developments deteriorate the EU23 competitiveness and
quality of industrial structure as compared with the East Asian economies
and the rest of the world. A logical consequence of this is a growing com-
petition of wages, taxes and productivity within the EU (Figure 10). The
system is in danger of developing into a race to the bottom.  
19
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21 The calculations are based on averages. In case of CEE countries, some data is missing; howev-
er, largest CEE economies like Hungary and Poland are well represented, as are the Baltic economies;
see also figures above with World Bank WDI onine database data. East Asia includes South Korea,
Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand.Figure 10: Labour cost and corporate tax competition in Europe, 2005 (data for labour
costs 2004)
Source: Eurostat databases; calculations by the authors.
The size of this problem becomes apparent when we look at the share of
CEE countries in world manufacturing. This share plummeted from 19,3%
in 1980 to 2,7% in 2001 (including the non-EU members from CEE and NIS
[UNCTAD 2004: 89]). Thus, in the CEE we can see a rapid increase in for-
eign direct investments in the automotive industry (UNCTAD 2003: 60-61)
and simultaneously a relocation in electronics out of the CEE (particularly
from Hungary, UNCTAD 2003: 62; on China in this context, see Boston
Consulting Group 2003). Both IBM and Philips decided to move their pro-
duction from Hungary to China in 2002. This indicates a loss of high-tech
industry (electronics) and a specialisation in a mature industry (automotive).
The industrial structure of CEE countries enables these countries to suck in
Western European industrial jobs, albeit at a significantly lower wages and
without significant linkages to a local economy. Even in ICT sector we can
see how companies like Elcoteq (one of the market leaders in mobile phone
assembly) offers wages just above minimum wages in CEE. Thus, there are
hardly any pressures in CEE countries that would significantly push the
wages and productivity higher, but there also appear to be hardly any pres-
sures for EU15 wages to stay high in the new EU.
In addition, the change of techno-economic paradigms in the 1980s and
1990s – from Fordist mass-production into one based on ICT – has cer-
tainly played a crucial role in the development dynamics of CEE as well as
in European integration. The Soviet style economy could cope relatively well
with the mass-production paradigm, yet almost by definition networking via
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Change in corporate tax rate 1995-2005 (%)trally. However, networks are perhaps one of the key characteristics of the
ICT-led paradigm (Perez 2006). Thus, the entire economic culture and struc-
ture of the CEE countries was fundamentally ‘Fordist’ and alien to the new
paradigm (Freeman 1998). This made the effects of rapid liberalization con-
siderably worse and, ironically, as ICT paradigm enables significant special-
ization and segmentation of markets and production, the new paradigm also
put heavy pressures (in terms of possibilities and competition) on Western
European manufacturers to outsource production to lower wage areas like
CEE.
Further, the EU enlargement falls into the middle period of the techno-eco-
nomic paradigm, typically characterised by financial crisis and socio-eco-
nomic and institutional adaptation to the new paradigm. We are at a stage
of the techno-economic paradigm where the harvest of the new technolo-
gies ‘is gathered under recessive symptoms and with more anxiety than
rejoicing’ (Schumpeter 1939, Vol. 1: 139). Similar wage pressures could be
observed in the 1930s when only strong unions kept the industrial sector
from the total collapse in real income which happened in the agricultural
sector (US rural wages fell 70 per cent in purchasing power during the early
1930s). Such processes feed back into the economy as falling demand, and
possibly into a new depression, which – just as the Asian Crisis – cannot
happen in neo-classical theory, but may well happen in practice. 
In addition, creation of European Monetary Union along the Maastricht cri-
teria of price and fiscal stability brought unwarranted tightness in labour,
monetary and fiscal policy areas in the 1990s that can be argued to have
caused main growth barriers in Germany that in turn affects competitive-
ness of other Euro-area countries (Kregel 1999, Bibow 2005, Hein/Truger
2007). In effect, Euro-area countries, most notably Germany, were cut off
from main policy means to alleviate pressures from CEE enlargement (cheap
labour and production) and techno-economic paradigm change (as special-
ization and segmentation, and as outsourcing), and this only magnified the
impact of both developments.
Thus the EU needs to go through a double institutional change: adapting to
an enlarged Europe as well as to a new techno-economic paradigm, both
under increased wage- and technology-pressures from other continents. And
this institutional change is hampered by unnecessarily tight monetary and fis-
cal policies that limit policy space to deal with abovementioned challenges.
4. The Lisbon process as well-intended but inappropriate answer
We have argued that the principles of the European enlargement in 1990s
are largely from the Washington Consensus toolbox. The main neoclassi-
cal/neoliberal assumption behind integration seems to be that enlarged inter-
21nal market should distribute capital to regions and countries needing it the
most (see also Priewe 2006: 157). At first sight it would seem that in this
policy regime, the EU Lisbon Strategy – the European Union economic strat-
egy launched in 2000 – represents a healthy theoretical shift towards a dual
emphasis on innovations as the basic engine of economic growth and on
social cohesion in order to mitigate the uneven economic growth that nec-
essarily follows in a dynamically innovative society. Europe seemed to have
left behind the neo-classically based standard textbook economics in favour
of Schumpeterian evolutionary economics. In what follows, we argue that
the Lisbon Strategy, in particular after its complete makeover in 2005, is in
reality hardly much more than a Schumpeterian icing on a solidly neoclas-
sical cake.
In reviewing the renewed Lisbon Strategy for Growth and Jobs, and in par-
ticular the myriad of policy papers and communications surrounding it,
22 fol-
lowing conclusions can be drawn:
1. The Lisbon Strategy is based on profoundly simplistic, and also
self-contradictory, understanding of innovation; on the one hand
innovation is understood in linear terms (from science to
growth), and on the other hand innovation is ubiquitous and part 
of market competition. It is thus not surprising that much of the
Lisbon Strategy is high-tech oriented and tries to alleviate the
socalled European paradox (good research, poor innovation) that 
in reality does not exist in many countries, in particular in the
new member states. The ubiquitous nature of the concept of
innovation, on the other hand, makes its usage blind to the
Listian understanding that different technologies and different 
economic activities experience innovation highly differently
(Singer 1950; Reinert 2006a). For instance, process innovations
that abound in service sectors with ICT usage, often undermine 
competitive position of companies and their wages (e.g., hotel
industry). Innovation is, by its nature, a process of creative
destruction and the Lisbon Strategy fails to a large extent to take 
the destructive elements into account. (Only in parts dealing 
with labour market policies we find initiatives targeted at allevi-
ating asymmetrical shocks; these measures are albeit of tempo-
rary nature. A notable exception is also planned state aid
reform.) We argue that this is the main failure of the Lisbon 
22
22 The main documents, also the renewed Lisbon Strategy termed Growth and Jobs, are available
on the European Commission website at http://ec.europa.eu/growthandjobs/index_en.htm. Here we
have looked in particular at European Commission 2005a, 2005b and 2005c, main documents spec-
ifying in detail how the renewed Strategy should work.23
23 Compare here in stark contrast recent policy initiatives in the state-level policies in the USA, see,
e.g., National Governors Association 2007.
Strategy to deliver on its promise: it entails very few policy ini-
tiatives that could enable the private sector to move towards
higher value added and fast growing sectors (the main Listian
principle of economic development and integration).
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2. On the contrary, the main driver of private sector innovation ac-
cording to the Lisbon Strategy is the market. The European
Union should enhance the internal market: 'This would also
increasethe level of competition - the main stimulus for innova-
tion' (European Commission 2006a: 5). Another major pillar for
innovation is seen in the low administrative costs (European
Commission 2006a: 6). The main theoretical idea behind these 
assumptions is the market failure approach (see, e.g., European 
Commission 2006a: 11). Such narrow approach to innovation
and economic dynamics in general has drawn high levels of criti-
cism in recent years (see Cimoli et al 2006 for a comprehensive
argument). 
3. The importance of market-driven neo-classical and -liberal 
thought is perhaps even stronger in proposed policy design 
instruments: ‘The identification of priority areas should be mar-
ket-driven, in full respect of the need to preserve free and fair
competition’ (European Commission 2006a: 12).24 This ap-
proach not only defies much of highly negative practical experi-
ences different states world-wide have had with such schemes
in last quarter century, it is also in direct opposition to regional
policy developments across Europe that emphasise local part-
nerships-based priority setting and cooperation (for a good over-
view, see European Commission 2006b). In addition, the new
member states in particular have in their innovation policies cho-
sen market-led approach with often catastrophic results in poli-
cy impact (Kattel 2004; Svarc 2006; Radocevic/Reid 2006). It
is also in contrast to the Commission’s plans to emphasise sec-
tor-specific approach to innovation (see, e.g., European Com- 
mission 2006c: 7). Further, market-driven understanding of 
innovation and industrial dynamics is a priori unable to under-
stand that different regions in Europe face fundamentally differ-
ent problems (both in terms of industrial and technological devel-
opment) and that pushing for ‘level playing-field’ of common
market might easily destroy further skill and knowledge capaci-
ties in the new member states. The Lisbon Strategy is essentially
denying that Europe has member states with widely differing
industrial/technological structure and that the convergence, par-
>ticularly in terms of productivity, is happening very slowly. In
such a situation, much of science and innovation policy 
attempts in the new member states are bound to have little 
effect on their respective industrial structures. Indeed, one can
argue that the new member states are subsidising international
science and R&D community since little of local science and
R&D has any impact on local economy due to lack of linkages.
One can also argue that it is a certain form of colonialism where 
the poor subsidise the rich (see also Jacobs 1984).
4. It is significant that in the entire documentation on the Lisbon
strategy, there is hardly any mention of monetary, fiscal and
wage policies. Yet, these policy fields arguably form the core 
problems for Euro-area countries, as argued above.
5. Conclusion
We have argued the following:
1. CEE industry experienced a strong Vanek-Reinert effect: in rapid
liberalisation of trade and markets between countries/regions
with strongly unequal levels of development, the first to suffer
from competition are the most advanced industries of the least
developed country/region. The last activity to remain is subsis-
tence agriculture. 
2. The policy environment created for and during the transition that
focused on macro-economic stability and speed of changes
meant, in reality, rapid simultaneous asset destruction and liabili-
ty creation for many big industrial companies. The nature of CEE
industry was profoundly misunderstood and thus much of indus-
trial and knowledge capacity was simply irrecoverably lost.
Rather than Schumpeterian creative destruction, many CEE
countries experienced destructive destruction and primitivisa-
tion. 
3. The economic and industrial policies in most CEE countries dur-
ing the 1990s stressed an openness to FDI and foreign borrow-
ing, which coincided with global changes in industrial and
knowledge networks that flushed these countries with out-
sourced industries, and hence these policies have generally
failed to significantly impact living standards or industrial struc-
ture in the host countries.
4. By early 2000s, most CEE countries stand at the brink of finan-
cial fragility in terms negative current account and external debt
growth rates, and are thus bound to keep policy environment
favourable for FDI via lower taxes, subsidies and infrastructure
enhancement. Typically, EU structural funding is used for these
24purposes, and not for industrial upgrading desperately needed by
most industries. 
5. Another effect of this development is a downward wage pres-
sure in the economic core, pointing to a tendency towards fac-
tor-price equalisation being achieved by the rich getting poorer 
without the poor getting significantly richer. Throughout late 
1990s and early 2000s Germany and many other continental
countries experienced stagnating or minimally rising real wages.
6. The main policy response to these challenges, the Lisbon
Strategy, is based on market-driven concept of innovation that 
tends to see innovation as combined with perfect competition
rather than recognising that ‘development’ is essentially a prod-
uct of Schumpeterian rent-seeking. In the alternative Schum-
peterian/Galbraithian world view, growth is a product of rent-
seeking businesses, big labour and big government. Failing to
take differences between economic activities and between con-
texts (countries) into account, the enhancement of the internal
market  per se is erroneously seen to be the main cure for
Europe’s problem. We argue that this, for many new member 
states and many regions of the old member states, is an eco-
nomically suicidal policy as it continuously destroys knowledge 
and skills, and the corresponding rents to capital and labour,
both East and West without creating new ones.
It can be argued that the European Union enlargement project is laudably
idealistic.
Whereas the US does not absorb any of the social costs in the Mexican
deindustrialisation of traditional industry and allows little (legal) immigration,
the European integrative model has the disadvantage of possibly accruing
very high costs on several counts. The large internal wage differentials are
likely to create strong downward pressures on the wage level in the core
countries, where the conflicts during 2004 and 2005 may have been just
preliminary skirmishes for a much larger battle to follow. Just as the free
float of alcohol from new member countries has caused a collapse of alco-
hol prices in a country like Sweden, a large scale free float of labour may
very well have a similar effect on labour prices (although some measures
have been taken). At the same time the rapid integration into the world
economy during the 1990s had already devastated the industrial structures
in the new member states, so there is little to build on except moving
already existing jobs and purchasing power eastwards, making European
integration into a lose-win zero-sum game type of integration, rather than a
win-win flying geese type.
25The EU enlargement has brought the new EU into a situation where it is dif-
ficult to see reasons that would stop pressures towards lower wages, cuts
in social benefits etc. An idealistic integration – which at a lower pace of
integration could have had more flying geese qualities – may end up as a
lose-lose strategy. The present European strategy does not capture the ben-
efits from really cheap imports in labour intensive products and crops as the
US does from Mexico, but on the cost side it may accrue heavy social
expenses associated with integrating the poor periphery. As with the inte-
gration of DDR, a first beneficial ‘pipe line effect’ will boost sales from the
‘old’ core, but this benefit is truly transitory.
Turning to the earlier theoretical discussion of types of economic integra-
tion, Europe is weak in the win-win categories. The present integration of
the European Union is clearly a departure from the slow and careful Listian
form of symmetrical integration that characterised the growth of the
European Common Market, starting in the immediate post-war period. In
the old mercantilist tradition, in the first decades of European integration it
was made sure that the important paradigm carrier industries – at that time
above all the automotive industry – were present in all large countries.
When Spain later acceeded to the Union, it already had a basic industrial
structure which – through gradual rather than abrupt tariff reductions – was
able to upgrade and successfully integrate symmetrically with the rest of
Europe. The automotive industry with its layers of suppliers is one example
of this successful transition. An artificially high exchange rate of the pese-
ta prevented social dumping and wage pressures on the rest of Europe, at
the cost of relatively high unemployment in Spain. However, with the for-
mer DDR, the exchange rate was so high and the economic structures so
rigid that the new Länder lost all competitiveness and were largely dein-
dustrialised. All in all, the integration of the large Spanish economy carries
all the elements of a carefully planned Listian integration.
There is, we argue, a qualitative quantum leap towards the worse in the
philosophy behind European integration between the careful economic inte-
gration of Spain, Portugal and Greece, on the one hand, and the 1 May
2004 integration, on the other. The first was pragmatic, gradual, and
Listian; the second was much more ideological, based on free trade shocks,
a product of economists and politicians who had come to believe in the
crude propaganda version of economics where markets create automatic
economic harmony. The errors created by the ideology of the 1990s now
threaten European wealth and welfare. Failing to take into account the
forces that by their very nature make economic development into an
uneven process, the Lisbon Strategy becomes merely a list of good inten-
tions. 
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